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Héctor D. Menéndez1
Computer Science Department, Middlesex University London.
Hendon Town Hall, The Burroughs, Hendon, London NW4 4BG, UK.
h.menendez@mdx.ac.uk
Abstract
The current development of quantum mechanics and its applications suppose a
threat to modern cryptography as it was conceived. The abilities of quantum
computers for solving complex mathematical problems, as a strong computa-
tional novelty, is the root of that risk. However, quantum technologies can
also prevent this threat by leveraging quantum methods to distribute keys.
This field, called Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is growing, although it still
needs more physical basics to become a reality as popular as the Internet. This
work proposes a novel methodology that leverages medoid-based clustering tech-
niques to design quantum key distribution networks on commercial fiber optics
systems. Our methodology focuses on the current limitations of these commu-
nication systems, their error loss and how trusted repeaters can lead to achieve
a proper communication with the current technology. We adapt our model to
the current data on a wide territory covering an area of almost 100,000 km2,
and prove that considering physical limitations of around 45km with 3.1 error
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loss, our design can provide service to the whole area. This technique is the
first to extend the state of the art network’s design, that is focused on up to 10
nodes, to networks dealing with more than 200 nodes.
Keywords: Quantum Key Distribution, Medoids, Trusted Repeater QKD,
Quantum Network, Partition Around Medoids
1. Introduction
One of the main theoretical challenges facing modern cryptography is its
vulnerability to future quantum computers. According to Shor’s algorithm [1],
once quantum computers raise, most public key encryption algorithms will be
decrypted in linear time. This is a major problem, not only affecting secure5
communication, but also protecting data - both future and current - bearing in
mind that encrypted data can be stored.
To face the threats that quantum computing proffers over classical cryptog-
raphy, we can use applications of quantum mechanics itself to implement new
solutions. Quantum cryptography allows us to design algorithms that, on the10
one hand, manage to overcome the limitations of classical physics [2] and, on the
other hand, are not vulnerable to attacks from quantum computers [3]. These
protocols are based on sending and measuring light polarization on a fiber optic
channel [4]. However, one of the main problems associated with these algo-
rithms is the distribution of the so-called quantum keys, given their physical15
properties.
There are numerous successful experiments on quantum communication for
sending keys at distances above 100 km on fiber optic channels such as those
found in [4]. However, a realistic commercial environment requires distances
below 50 km based on experiences [5] that can demonstrate that, at such dis-20
tances with current commercial equipment (such as those manufactured by the
company ID Quantique SA), the achieved results are remarkable 2.
2This device allows to exchange about 20,000 quantum keys in an hour [6].
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Our main goal is to propose a novel methodology to create a distribution
network of quantum keys that allows to provide service over a fiber optic network
on a given territory (Section 4). The main problem of our network is to decide25
whether it is possible to set trusted repeaters on the quantum key distribution
process, as those proposed by Salvail et al. [7], considering the current features
of the provided fiber optic network (Section 2). To this end, this work focuses on
a fibre optic network of a commercial operator on the territory of Castilla y León,
Spain (Section 5.1). With this information, we propose a methodology based30
on clustering algorithms to minimize the number of quantum key repeaters on
that specific territory, so our methodology does not only create the distribution
network but also optimizes it. For the sake of the authors, this is the first work
focused on designing large networks and distributing the repeaters inside the
networks. With this approach we can extend the current networks, whose size35
is up to 10 nodes (Section 7) to networks with more than 200 nodes (Section
5).
In order to evaluate this methodology, a series of experiments have been
carried out that simulate, on the aforementioned territory, how to create this
distribution network (Section 5). In this case, two maximum distances between40
repeaters based on distances below 50 km have been considered. The first max-
imum distance is 35 km, and the second 45 km. These distance are boundaries
for the theoretical and modulation error of the fiber optic channel (Section 3).
The results show that for a network with a limit distance of 35 km, the entire
territory of Castilla y León can be served using 100 repeaters. However, it is45
necessary to place a minimum of five repeaters outside the fiber optic service
areas. In the case of a maximum distance of 45 km, it would suffice to use the
available network by docking 100 repeaters on it. This would ensure secure com-
munications using quantum encryption over all of Castilla y León, a territory
that currently occupies 100,000 km2 (Section 6).50
For reproducibility porposes, we have published the data and the code for
3
the experiments3.
2. Quantum Communication Protocols and BB84
Quantum key distribution (QKD) mainly makes use of two large families of
protocols [8]. These algorithms are based on the transmission of qubits: BB8455
and B92. Other families, like E91, work on linked pairs.
The BB84 protocol is considered to be the first quantum key distribution
protocol. It was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [9]. It is an applica-
tion of quantum properties. In this protocol four states and two alphabets are
used, each of which with two states.60
To explain the BB84 protocol, we are going to consider that there is a mes-
sage exchange between Bob and Alice. Both interlocutors are connected through
two communication channels. One quantum and one conventional. When we
refer to someone trying to intercept the messages, we will refer to Eve. We
also assume that the conventional channel is authenticated so that no spy can65
perform attacks of impersonation or modifications to the message (integrity).
However, Eve can, according to the laws of quantum physics, try to read from
the quantum channel, although this will modify the message [9]. Algorithm (1)
describes the protocol behaviour.
We will consider a Vernam cipher applied to the encoding and decoding of70
the message, i.e., the key and the message are considered as vectors of num-
bers, character by character, and they are added to create the encoded message
and subtracted to decode the message [10]. The BB84 protocol creates and
exchanges the secure key.
First, Alice will write the message that she wants to transmit and she will75
transcribe it as a sequence of 0s and 1s. BB84 generates a key of the same
size (or larger) as the message to be transmitted. To do this, Alice generates a
random sequence of 0s and 1s. Alice will choose the alphabet in which she will
3https://github.com/hdg7/QKDNetworks.
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Algorithm 1 Protocol BB84 based on 4 quantum states
Alphabet z: {|0〉, |1〉}
Alphabet x: {|+ 〉, | − 〉}
1: Alice generates a sequence of random values of zeros and ones that corre-
sponds with the key she wants to exchange with Bob.
2: Alice generates another random sequence, now with the bases she will use
for encoding of the key generated in the previous step.
3: For each bit generated, Alice performs the following action: if the bit is zero,
Alice codifies it by randomly choosing between |0〉 (alphabet-z) and | + 〉
(alphabet-x). If the bit is one, she encodes it uniformly at random between
|1〉 (alphabet-z) and | − 〉 (alphabet-x).
4: Alice sends the sequence of qubits to Bob.
5: Bob generates a random sequence with the bases that he uses to decode the
sequence of states received from Alice.
6: Bob measures each received state in the base corresponding to the generated
sequence.
7: Bob sends Alice the sequence of bases used through an authenticated public
channel.
8: Alice compares the sequence of bases used for the key encoding with the
sequence provided by Bob in the previous step, remaining only with those
measurements for which both bases have coincided.
9: Alice and Bob share a sequence of values formed by those in which the
positions where the bases of preparation and measurement have coincided.
10: After the previous points there is a subsequent process aimed at estimating
the presence of a spy, correcting errors, and amplifying privacy.
5
transmit (z or x). Then, she follows the rest of the steps of the BB84 protocol
to exchange the key (Algorithm 1). It is important to remark that, in the last80
step of the BB84 algorithm, the values that do not coincide are discarded.
Once both share a secure single-use key, the message is encoded with that
key by Alice and sent it to Bob. He, upon receiving it, will make the binary
sum with the key that Alice had previously transferred to him to discover the
original text.85
After executing the algorithm, and once the key has been generated by
BB84, Alice will use the key to encode every new message. Bob will then be
able to decode the messages with this shared key. The security is guaranteed
because the creation and transmission of the key are based on the fundamentals
of quantum mechanics. The presence of a potential spy (Eve) could compromise90
the exchange of the key, because if she measures the channel, she will produce a
state change. However, the security of the protocol lies in the fact that it uses
two alphabets with non-orthogonal states, Eve cannot simultaneously measure
the polarization on x and on z for the same qubit.
3. Quantum Key Distribution on Networks95
Currently, there are different works that aim to implement the distribution
of quantum keys through commercial channels [4]. In this work, we aim to
construct on the state of the art, focusing on creating an optimum network on
commercial optical fiber. Our system aims to optimize the number of repeaters
needed on the network based on a known infrastructure.100
The fiber optic implementation does not use light polarization as it could
be done for high speed systems designed for short distances or laboratories. On
the other hand, we consider phase-coding techniques. Moreover, at present,
the technology for emitting single photons is not commercially mature, so we
consider very attenuated laser pulses [11].105
There are two fundamental problems affecting the transmission of photons.
The first one refers to the physical properties of the fiber channel itself. Fibre
6
optics is not an ideal channel, so it absorbs part of the photons it tries to
transmit. The other problem lies in the receivers, in our case the repeaters [7],
located at the ends of the channel: these receivers need a recovery time between110
the arrest of one photon and the next.
The length of the transmitted wavelength directly affects the quality of the
transmission itself. In such a way that the material in which the channel itself
is built - the optical fibre - has an absorption probability that varies depending
on the wavelength that is transmitted through this channel. The color of light115
is therefore the basis for how much will be lost during transmission. Evidently,
the distance -length of the fiber- makes the loss greater as it increases. Starting
from a certain distance that cannot be modified –distance to which we want
the communication to occur–, the transmission can only be improved by using
materials that offer less absorption and/or wavelengths that, in a given material,120
represent a lower rate of absorption in its transmission. Therefore, if the distance
is known, the fiber to be used is already implemented, hence we only have the
variable relative to the frequency of light to be transmitted.
As an example, three of the most outstanding relatively recent solutions are
currently highlighted:125
• In 2017, Toshiba launched a commercial solution for distributing key in-
formation at a speed of 13.7 megabits per second [12]. This distribution
capacity surpasses any current system, achieving speed improvements up
to seven times more powerful than its 1.9Mbps systems developed in 2016.
• In 2006, Hiskett et al. [13] developed a system that extended the distribu-130
tion of quantum keys to long-distances, in their solution, distances greater
than 50 km. These systems are based on ultra-low-noise transition-edge
sensors (TESs). These systems were capable of exchanging keys at dis-
tances of 67.5 km.
• In 2012, Patel et al. [14] created a system based on the temporary filtering135
effect to reject noisy photons. It achieved high bidirectional transmission
ratio up to Gb/s. This system is capable of transmitting over fiber optics
7
Fiber Length Measurement Theoretical Error (ET) ET + Mod. Error
0-10 Km 3.6% 0% 3.1%
10-20 Km 3.4% 0% 3.1%
20-30 Km 3.1% 0% 3.1%
30-40 Km 3.5% 0% 3.1%
40-50 Km 3.4% 0% 3.1%
60-70 Km 3.5% 0.2% 3.3%
70-80 Km 5.1% 0.6% 3.7%
80-90 Km 4.0% 1.2% 4.3%
90-100 Km 6.2% 1.7% 4.8%
100-105 Km 7.3% 2.0% 5.0%
105-110 Km 6.9% 2.4% 5.2%
115-120 Km 8.1% 3.1% 6.0%
120-125 Km 8.9% 3.9% 7.0%
Table 1: Quantum error at bit level (Quantum Bit Error or QBER) in percentage to fibre
length, extracted from the works of Gobby et al. [15].
.
up to 90 km away. It is one of the systems closest to large-scale transmis-
sion.
Apart from these solutions, several papers by Gobby et al. [15] have studied140
both theoretically and experimentally the efficiency of fiber optic communica-
tions with respect to bit-level quantum error in communications. The most
relevant results regarding the relationship between distance and error can be
found in Table 1. It can be seen, especially in the theoretical error, that from
50 km the growth of the error begins to play a significant role. This information145
will be used later in the experimental design of this work to establish physical
limits of quantum communication (see Section 5.2).
4. Medoid-based Quantum Key Distribution Network
Our methodology employs an existing fiber optic network to create a QKD
network on its infrastructure. This requires two main steps: 1) select which150
nodes of the network will act as repeaters and, 2) optimize the number of re-
peaters as they are the new infrastructures that need to be added. Considering
how fiber optic networks distribute around localities, we consider a municipality
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as a potential place to set a repeater and, over a given map, our methodology
will find those municipalities that are best candidates to host repeaters.155
When addressing the problem of repeater distribution, we uses a methodol-
ogy based on grouping municipalities through a k-medoids algorithm (Section
4.2.1). This algorithm will help, given a set of municipalities, to select those
that are physically close to each other. The algorithm will then facilitate the
selection of the most central municipality within the set of nearby municipali-160
ties. This municipality will be considered as a candidate, within the set, to host
a repeater. The methodology, finally, will try to connect the possible repeaters
among them to generate a distribution network.
This type of problem is similar to the Travelling Salesman Problem, where
the most optimal route has to be selected for a traveller who intends to cover a165
certain set of places. In this case, “the traveller” would correspond to the set
of quantum keys, and “the places” would correspond to the municipalities. The
traveller’s problem is NP-complete [16], and requires approximation methods
in order to find local solutions. Inspired by state of the art solutions applied
in this scenario, this paper addresses the problem of creating a quantum key170
distribution network on two levels. First, a local solution will be sought that
reduces the number of municipalities and simplifies the network to a fixed num-
ber of repeaters. The distances between them will then be measured in order
to generate a communication network between them.
4.1. Basic Network of Municipalities175
When selecting municipalities as potential candidates for repeater place-
ment, it is important to bear two factors in mind: the selected municipality
must have the rest of the municipalities in its group within the range of dis-
tances required in quantum key distribution, and the representative municipality
of the group must have, at least, one other representative municipality within180
the limit distance in order to generate the distribution network.
The first part of the algorithm focuses on finding these representative ele-
ments. Considering X = {x1, . . . , xn} the set of all potential municipalities, this
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first part is divided into the following steps:
1. Select the maximum distance D between network repeaters.185
2. Calculate the distance matrix d(·, ·) for all potential municipalities. This
distance matrix can be defined in many possible ways, since the algorithm
will not require the metric itself. In Section 5.1, the experiments use the
geodetic distance based on the GPS coordinates of municipalities.
3. Select an initial number of repeaters k.190
4. Select an initial random set of repeaters m1, . . . ,mk ∈ X following a
uniform distribution.
5. Apply the Partition Around Medoids algorithm (Section 4.2.1) to extract
a final list of m∗j repeaters that are a solution to the optimization process.
6. Evaluate each group cj associated to each repeater to check that for all195
xi ∈ cj , d(xi,m∗j ) < D.
7. If this last condition is not satisfied, increase k and repeat steps 4 to 7.
To understand how this grouping methodology is performed, the following
section outlines how to apply the grouping or clustering algorithm to munici-
palities data.200
4.2. Using Clustering to Identify Representative Municipalities
The problem of distribution of quantum keys over a given population requires
not only to know the physical limits established by communication between
nodes, but also specific methodologies that allow for optimum positioning of
repeaters. For this second part our methodology applies clustering, a known205
unsupervised automatic learning technique [17].
Given a data set X = {x1, . . . , xn} where n represents the cardinality of the
set –or the total number of elements–, a clustering algorithm divides this set
into k groups, or clusters cj , where C = {c1, . . . , ck} represents the total set of
clusters [17]. This division is unsupervised, referring to the algorithm’s ability210
to separate data without using any supervised information – usually provided
by an expert in the data set – to measure the quality of clusters during the
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discrimination process. A clustering algorithm only uses a cost function that it
tries to minimize, based on the data’s own characteristics.
The selection of the cost function is fundamental, not only because it defines
the grouping criterion, but also because it will facilitate or hinder the algorithm
optimization process. Originally, these functions start from a distance that they
try to minimize. The most frequently used distance is the Euclidean distance
between each cluster element and its centroid vj . Thus, a clustering algorithm
must find the discrimination that best minimizes this distance for each element






||xi − vj || (1)
In this case, a centroid is defined as the expectation or equidistant distance of







The best-known clustering algorithm, k-means [18], tries to reduce these215
distances using an iterative process. Given a fixed number of clusters, k, and
assuming that the centroids vj acquire random values at the beginning of the
execution of the algorithm, the process successively performs the following two
steps:
1. Assign the xi points to the nearest centroid.220
2. Recalculate the centroids.
One of the main problems with clustering algorithms is finding the optimal
number of clusters, k [19]. The choice of this value depends as much on the
criteria to be satisfied with the grouping as on the metrics used by the algorithm.
In the first case, the analyst decides this value. In the second case, the value is225
decided through a metric that measures the quality of the clusters. This quality
can be measured individually, for example, through a quadratic distance [18];
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or collectively, through, for example, the Silhouette [20] or the Dunn Index [21].
Although these clustering techniques generalize the way clustering is usually
applied, there are several other varieties of clustering that endorse graph the-230
ory [22, 23, 24], bio-inspired algorithms [25, 26, 27, 28], and big data methods
[29, 30, 31]. Also, it has multiple applications to several fields, for instance,
behavioural models [32, 33], malware analysis [34, 35], social network analysis
[36, 37], biomedicine [38, 39], and marketing [40, 41, 42]. In this work, clustering
will be applied in order to group municipalities by distance, in such a way that235
it can be determined in which places quantum key repeaters should be placed.
The clustering algorithm will be used to select positions for the repeaters op-
timally, with the aim of minimizing them while maximizing the connections
between them. Each repeater will correspond to one cluster, and the number of
repeaters to the number of clusters. However, given that we want to choose the240
municipality to place the repeaters within the possible municipalities, we can
not use a centroid-based strategy. The use of centroids would cause some re-
peaters to be in marine or inaccessible areas. To correct this potential problem,
a clustering strategy based on medoids will be used.
4.2.1. PAM: Partition Around Medoids245
Partition Around Medoids, or k-medoids [43], is a variation of k-means where,
instead of using centroids, the selected element is the best, within the cluster,








In this case, the optimization follows two directions: the selection of the250
cluster and the selection of a representative element within it or medoid. The
possibility of choosing an element of the cluster avoids the need to use a metric
space or, specifically, an Euclidean space. It is enough to define a matrix of
distance d between all the elements of X. In equation 3, d(·, ·) describes this
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distance between two elements belonging to X. Thus, since the optimization255
process only needs information about the distance, and not how to calculate it,
there is no need to describe the distance itself.
PAM facilitates the selection of representative municipalities within the mu-
nicipalities to be connected through the quantum key distribution network, and
ensures connectivity between these municipalities and all municipalities belong-260
ing to the same cluster. It is still necessary to create a network between the
representative municipalities in order to carry out the distribution of quantum
keys.
4.3. Repeater’s Network
In order to ensure that any municipality within the network can commu-265
nicate with any other municipality, it is necessary to establish a network of
repeaters based on the representative municipalities selected in the previous
step. This network will be defined as follows:
1. Each representative municipality will be connected to all the municipalities
in its cluster. In this way, all municipalities in the same cluster will be able270
to exchange quantum keys using the repeater. The previous step ensures
that the repeater is less than D km away from each municipality in its
cluster.
2. Each repeater will connect with all the repeaters in its environment that
are at a distance less than D. In this way, if there is more than one repeater275
near to another, different routing can be used to reduce the saturation of
the key distribution.
These criteria when creating the network not only facilitates better routing,
but also makes it easy to identify possible regions isolated from the network. In
order to find these regions, it is sufficient to calculate the number of connected280
components of the network. Formally, the network is a non-directed graph G,
divided into vertices V , representing municipalities, and edges E representing
13
those municipalities that are either within a cluster and connected to its re-
peater, or are repeaters at a distance smaller than D. In this way, the number
of connected components of the graph can be calculated in several ways, where285
the most representative are the multiplicity of its eigen-values, or estimation
using random paths [44]. This work uses the second (see Section 5.1). If the
number of connected components of the graph is 1, the network is fully con-
nected. Otherwise, the following strategies can be used:
1. Search for intermediate locations between municipalities to place repeaters290
that reduce the distance between two known repeaters.
2. Increase the number of initial repeaters and re-generate the groupings of
municipalities in the first step.
3. Sacrifice part of the quality of key communication, increasing the distance
between repeaters.295
In the following sections of the work, we simulate, in a practical way, how to
generate this type of networks over a known area, taking into account the special
cases mentioned above. Besides, it is shown how the distance D, considered in
the state of the art of quantum key distribution, could be feasible for specific
regions and what kind of measures to take in case of finding isolated regions.300
4.4. Complete Algorithm Flow
The complete process flow for creating quantum key distribution networks
is summarized in Algorithm 2. This algorithm only needs the coordinates of
the different municipalities that will be considered (X) as input data, and a
limit distance that will be used to verify that the municipalities comply with305
the physical restrictions D.
The algorithm starts by defining the array of distances d(·, ·) between each
pair of data xi, xj ∈ X. Since this matrix is symmetrical and its diagonal is 0,
by the definition of distance, it is enough to define only its triangular matrix.
Once the matrix is defined, the two general steps will be carried out.310
The first step starts by setting the initial value of k to 2 (lines 2 and 5). The
value of k represents both the number of clusters for the clustering algorithm
14
Algorithm 2 Quantum Key Distribution Algorithm
.
Entry: D: Limit physical distance
X: List of municipalities coordinates data
Output: C: Cluster of municipalities
R: Repeater list
G: Network Graph
1: Define d(·, ·), the matrix of geographical distances between municipalities,
for all par xi, xj ∈ X, such that xi 6= xj .





7: until ((k ≥ |X|) OR (verifyDistance(C,D)== TRUE)
8: R=extractMedoids(C)
9: G=graphDistanceLimit(R,D)
10: until (isConnected(G) == TRUE))
11: annexClusters(G, C)
12: return C,R,G
(Section 4.2), and the number of repeaters that will finally be selected. The
PAM algorithm (line 6) is applied, which groups the data into clusters based
on distances. The value of k is increased to continue the loop (line 5), which315
iterates until it obtains a group discrimination that guarantees that the distances
between each representative element –or medoids– of each cluster is at a distance
less than D with respect to the rest of elements. This is verified in the loop
condition with the verifyDistance function (line 7). If this distance cannot
be guaranteed, the algorithm will continue until a cluster is assigned to each320
element.
If the distance is satisfied, the repeaters’ list, R, is extracted from the k
representative elements of C (line 8). These elements are then used to build the
repeater’s network G (line 9). This network is constructed in the following way:
the repeaters act as network nodes, and the D distance is used to decide which325
connections need to be set. If two nodes are physically closer than D, there will
be a connection between them. Once the network has been created, the main
objective is to guarantee its connectivity, i.e. that it has only one connected
15
component (Section 4.3). If this happens, the network is ready (line 10), it is
only necessary to connect the rest of nodes, i.e. the non-representative elements330
of the clusters (or non-repeaters) to the network (line 11). If this does not
happen, the number of repeaters is increased again (line 5), and the execution
continues. The result will be a fully connected G network.
5. Experiments
In order to understand the effectiveness of the proposed method for creating335
a quantum key distribution network, this part performs two simulations on a
known territory, in this case Castilla y León. The simulations aim to test the
effectiveness of the method and to show how it can be used in a practical way
to create a network from scratch in a selected territory.
5.1. Experimental Setup340
In order to carry out the experiments, we chose municipalities in Castilla
y León with a population of at least 1,000 inhabitants as the data set. These
are considered within the plans of Telefónica4, a Spanish multinational supplier
of commercial fibre optics. From the 2,248 municipalities in Castilla y León
identified, only 267 comply with the population restriction 5. This limits the345
number of repeaters in the experimentation. In order to be able to measure
quality, our experiments create different networks between 10 and 250 repeaters.
Although the works of Gobby et al. [15] manage to obtain a distribution
of quantum keys over fibre of up to 100 km distance, under the BB84 protocol
(see Section 2), the approximate error rate obtained by these authors is around350
9% (see Table 1, in the Section 3). For that reason, this simulation uses more
conservative approaches when creating the distribution network. According to
the work of Gaya et al. [45] on the same protocol, conservative limits are es-
tablished for the secure transmission of keys between 30 and 50 km. According
4https://www.telefonica.com/es/web/sala-de-prensa/-/telefonica-llevara-la-fibra-al-97-de-los-hogares-en-2020
5Population data obtained from the INE
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to these data, a first simulation will be performed considering several potential355
levels for D (the key communication limit distance) that fall in the 20 to 100
km distance range. Besides, considering the conservative limits, a second ex-
periment has been carried out with two representative mean distances within
them: 35km and 45km.
The implementation of the PAM algorithm used has been extracted from360
the package cluster of R6. The values of k vary according to the number of
repeaters, although all other values of the algorithm have been set by default.
The distance metric used was the geographical distance obtained from the GPS
positions of the municipalities data set. This distance has been calculated using
the R7 geosphere package. For the last part, which calculates the number of365
related components of the repeater network, the R8 igraph package based on
random paths has been used.
5.2. Results
Two experiments have been carried out to measure the quality of the net-
works in relation to the number of repeaters. In the first case, the limit distance370
is considered as a parameter and is manipulated together with the number of
repeaters. The second case fixes the limit distance, considering two conser-
vative distances, and measures the quality of the network for these distances,
specifically, 35 and 45 km.
Figures 1 and 2 show the result of the first experiment. This establishes a375
grid of distances and number of repeaters that varies between 20 and 100 km
for the distances and between 10 and 250 for the repeaters. The main objective
of the experiment is to check at which points the entire network is connected,
i.e. when the number of connected components of the graph is 1 (see Section
4). The lighter blue of the figures represents the lowest number of components,380





to all municipalities without leaving anyone isolated within the distance ranges
established in the state of the art. As it can be seen in both figures, the optimum
values of distance would have to be located from 80Km in order to place the
least number of possible repeaters (between 10 and 20), however, for distances385
around 40 km, about 100 repeaters are enough to create the connected network.
When the distance limit falls below 40 kilometres, Figure 2 shows an asymp-
totic behaviour. In these cases, the algorithm is not able to find a discrimination
of repeaters that allows to generate a complete network. It is necessary to place
extra repeaters in unpopulated areas in order to complement the service. This390
phenomenon is most clearly seen in the second experiment.
The second experiment focuses on the state of the art distances: 35 and 45
km. In these cases, represented in Figure 3, the number of related components
increases at first. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the clusters have
not succeeded in having their internal elements satisfying the D limit distance.395
This is solved from 50 repeaters in the case of 35km; and 25 repeaters in the
case of 45km. In both cases, all clusters satisfy the distance limit (Section 4.1).
For 35 km, it is not possible to get a fully connected network (Figure 3). The
components reach an asymptotic behavior in 5 components. From 100 repeaters,
4 of them remain disconnected, and they are connected between them when their400
number increases, but they are not connected to the main network. These places,
as discussed in Section 4.3, could be discarded, annexed through intermediate
repeaters or reduce the quality of communication, increasing the limit distance
at those particular points, however, the rest of municipalities (specifically 260)
would be connected. The municipalities disconnected from the network formed405
in Castilla y León are 7: 3 of them in Soria, specifically Ágreda, Arcos de Jalón
and Ólvega; and 4 of them in Zamora, specifically Alcañices, Galende, Puebla
de Sanabria and Trabazos.
The 45 km experiment (see Figure 3) shows more positive results in gener-
ating a fully connected network, since it is generated from 100 repeaters. This410
proves that any quantum key distribution system using at least this type of
















Figure 1: Experimental results considering the two variables of the experiment: the limit
distance of the repeaters (D) and the number of repeaters (k). The graph shows the number
of connected components that the network has for different values of these parameters. It can
be seen that the predominant value is 1 component in most cases, so the network would be
connected.
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Figure 2: This plot fixes the view of Figure 1 to a given plane and analyzes the contours of

























































Figure 3: Considering the D distance limit of about 35Km (left), there is an asymptotic
behavior in the number of connected components from 100 repeaters. The components do not
fall below 5. Considering the distance limit D of about 45Km (right), it can be seen that the
connected network is reached from 100 repeaters.
within Telefónica’s fibre optic potential range.
Considering the experimental results and the state of the art, it can be seen
that it is possible to generate a quantum key distribution network to serve415
Castilla y León, a territory that covers 94,226 km2. The next section discusses
these results, showing what a potential network based on the proposed algorithm
would look like.
6. Discussion
During the experimentation of the previous section, it is shown how the420
proposed method for creating a quantum key distribution network is able not
only to create the network with respect to the parameters established within
the physical limitations of the problem, but also to optimize the distribution of
repeaters within the network.
In order to visualise the effects of this selection, we have analysed the munici-425
palities in detail. Figure 4 shows all the municipalities of Castilla y León consid-
ered for the experiment constraint to a population of 1,000 people. As explained





Adrada (La) 40.29935 -4.634857
Arenal (El) 40.26487 -5.087197
Arenas de San Pedro 40.20872 -5.091141
Arévalo 41.06443 -4.721681
Ávila 40.65642 -4.700323
Barco de Ávila (El) 40.35711 -5.523521





Hoyo de Pinares (El) 40.50175 -4.422359
Madrigal de las Altas Torres 41.08944 -4.998767
Mombeltrán 40.25992 -5.01777
Navaluenga 40.41096 -4.707685
Navas del Marqués (Las) 40.60316 -4.326336
Pedro Bernardo 40.24287 -4.914765




Figure 4: Municipalities of Castilla y León with more than 1,000 inhabitants that have been
used during experimentation.
optic netw rks, where the keys would be distributed. Two effects can be seen in
the figure: there are several areas with many nearby municipalities and, at the430
same time, there are also several isolated points. These isolated points would
explain both the high number of repeaters needed and the problem encountered
when trying to apply a limit distance of 35 km.
In order to understand the final decisions of the algorithm, Figure 5 shows
the position of the repeaters for the experiment with a limit distance of 45 km.435
These results show how a few repeaters can be placed to serve the areas of
higher concentration, while at the points of lower concentration it is necessary
to place a repeater directly. Considering the five isolated municipalities is the
35 km experiment, it is enough to see on the map that only a few intermediate
22














Población: Barco de √Åvila (El)
Latitud: 40.35711
Longitud: -5.523521
Datos de mapas ©2018 Google, Inst. Geogr. Nacional20 km 
Contact map owner
Red de distribución de claves cuánticas
Figure 5: Municipalities of Castilla y León selected by the distribution algorithm to host
quantum key repeaters. These one hundred municipalities would complete the network by
associating the municipalities of the Figure 4
.
repeaters would be needed, given that these are in the most border areas of the440
reg ons considered.
If the results of Gobby et al. [15] were considered, this network could be
significantly simplified. Taking into account the results of Experiment 1 (Section
5.2), from 100 km, it is enough to place about 10 repeaters in the whole area
of Castilla y León. However, as mentioned in the Section 5.1, the error rate of445
9% would mean a cost in the service’s quality, the impact of which cannot be
measured through simulations. Considering that these networks must provide
keys on Internet services in a high population (according to the INE of about 2.5
million inhabitants), it is better to use more conservative limits that the same
23
authors established at 50.6 Km [5], with the guarantee that the error would be450
limited to 5%.
Apart from the results obtained by the quantum key distribution network
creation system, one of the main advantages of the algorithm introduced in this
work (Section 4) is its ability to find this selection in a totally unsupervised way,
i.e. without requiring any human feedback in the process. As a consequence,455
either to extend the network or to create a new one in other regions of Spain, it
is enough to provide a new list of municipalities. The algorithm will be able to
start from this list to obtain another network that will allow a new distribution
to be generated without any added effort.
In addition, the algorithm is based only on the distances entered as boundary460
distances and on the population map, so it is agnostic of the communication
protocol used, as long as it has information on its physical limits. This allows
to use different communication protocols in different areas to create networks
depending on the established demands. In order to extend the network and
make it more secure, our algorithm can serve as an input for secure network465
algorithms, such as the one proposed by Zhou et al. [46], which designs the
communication scheme of a given network to guarantee security while reducing
the number of intermediate nodes. Their algorithm also design key management
and data scheduling schemes to optimize data transmission. Our approach
can geographically set a basic network while the approach of Zhou et al. can470
provide relevant tune-ups to make the network secure. This indeed can extend
the algorithm providing an initial solution from our algorithm and using the
method proposed by the authors to optimize the connection and the positions
of the repeaters locally. Although we will explore this possibility in future work,
our algorithms could join following the steps below:475
1. Select a region in the map and the municipalities that have fiber optics
providers and need to be part of the QKD network.
2. Apply the medoids algorithm having into account the distance to find the
initial repeater’s position.
24
3. Based on the medoids, apply Zhou et al.’s algorithm setting weights to480
the local network and recalculate the position of the medoids based on
the Lyapunov network optimization technique [47]. This will also improve
the communications of the basic network which is something that our
algorithm is not considering at the moment. Providing the first solution
will reduce the effort of the Lyapunov optimization process as it would be485
performed locally.
4. Connect the local areas of the network to provide the general network and
measure the components to guarantee the connectivity.
With this idea we could also create a secure network over a given population
automatically.490
It is important to recall that the main differences between classical networks
and QKD networks are the communication physics (Section 3) and the protocols
to guarantee a secure communication (Section 2). Moreover, the methods for
wireless communication networks normally take into consideration the numbers
of users that they need to serve, which is something unknown at the moment495
for the QKD technology, although we are currently exploring this point by mea-
suring the message exchange rates that different amounts of users can generate,
and adjusting it to the current known technology, including the error rates in
the exchange of messages. We can see similarities between the network con-
struction processes because we need to adapt our network design to existing500
fiber optic networks. For that reason, our algorithm is similar to network algo-
rithms. However, in terms of security, our network behaves differently reducing
constraints related to potential attacks.
7. Related Work
The problem of creating a quantum key distribution network is divided in505
two main approaches [7]: 1) quantum channel switching paradigm that creates
an end-to-end channel among every agent; and, 2) trusted repeated paradigm
that allows intermediate nodes in the network to route keys. The first paradigm
25
is limited by the physical distance limits of the communication process. For
instance, on fibre optic, this limit is about 100Km, even though the communi-510
cation quality starts to suffer significantly for distances over 45/50 km [15]. The
second method, which is the target of this work, aims to surpass these physical
limitations by adding repeaters to the network.
In terms of nodes, there are several networks that already operate. These
networks are DARPA [48], covering a range of 50Km with around 10 nodes,515
SECOQC [49, 50] that uses 6 nodes around Vienna (on the dependencies of
Siemens), the network designed by Wang et al. [51] containing 9 nodes around
3 cities and covering 200km (this network extends a former one containing 5
nodes and covering 150Km [52]), and the Tokyo network [53] with 6 nodes and
covering 90Km, among others. Even if these networks are working experimental520
prototypes on specific dependencies, their design on the existing territory has not
been optimized to follow a specific criteria. Our approach aims to automatize the
design of the network, which, for the sake of the authors, is the first methodology
that any researcher has proposed to quantum key distribution approaches. Also,
our methodology is focused on the design of larger networks were we can have525
hundreds of nodes, and to select which nodes will act as repeaters that, again,
is also novel.
As we state in Section 3, there is a significant amount of research measuring
the limits on direct communications. These experiments focuses on understand-
ing how the physical limitations affect the communication abilities. Researchers530
focus on different protocols where the most famous are the BB and E fami-
lies [8]. For the BB ones, the distance has significantly be increased. Starting
with distances of 30 Km using interferometric quantum cryptography schemes
[54], to a distance of 120Km with an improvement on the technology focused
on optimization of the interferometer and single photon detection [15]. Current535
technologies pay more attention to the transmission rate using single photon
detection systems [55]. Although these distances, related to quantum channel
switching, are reasonable for communication, they have loss problems. For that
reason, we chose the conservative method, provided by Gobby et al. [15], be-
26
cause this methodology can also guarantee a low error rate (3.1% in the distances540
that we are considering).
In terms of security, this depends on the properties of quantum mechanics,
as long as it behaves as the postulates defined in [56]. According to these prin-
ciples, when an attacker interacts with the key that is distributed, it causes a
disturbance in the communication that could be detected by the communication545
agents. To guarantee the security of the communication, the attacker must not
have access to the devices that the agents use for quantum key exchange. In
addition, until now, it has been assumed that the classic channel was authenti-
cated and that Alice and Bob were really who they claimed to be. Nevertheless,
there are some quantum channel attacks to consider.550
Suppose that Eve has taken individual samples of each qubit and measures
them one after the other. She can perform a beam splitter attack, probably the
most damaging that can be done to quantum key distribution systems over fiber
optics. This attack uses an optical coupler on the quantum channel to extract
part of the key without Bob noticing Eve’s presence [57]. Another known attack555
is the photon number division attack [58], where Eve performs a non-destructive
measurement of the number of photons on each pulse. If it detects more than
one photon in each pulse, it will store one of them to measure it. The rest will
be sent to Bob [59]. Finally, another attack Eve can perform is the intercept and
resend attack [60]. Assuming Eve has access to the repeaters, she can intercept560
the photons, measure them using a random basis and forward the photons to
Alice.
8. Conclusions
The application of quantum physics to computation implies a paradigm shift.
The transition from classical to quantum computing is the starting point for565
finding solutions to historical problems that have been unresolved for some
time. Quantum systems can perform mathematical operations that invert one-
way functions with a low computational cost, breaking most designs of secure
27
communication systems based on these functions. Therefore, it is necessary to
strengthen current communication systems by implementing algorithms resis-570
tant to such possible attacks while new quantum applications are designed to
achieve faster and more efficient secure communications.
In this context, our work has reviewed different quantum key distribution
(QKD) works to understand their physical properties and limitations. After
analyzing the results of laboratory tests of different research groups, we focused575
our effort on implementing an optimized quantum key distribution network,
since the maximum distance at which these systems work is relatively low. To-
gether with the latter, we have found the need for the designed system to be
operated over a commercial (general purpose) fibre optic network.
Our experimentation finds the optimum way to deal with the distribution of580
repeaters to cover a wide area. Specifically, the surface area occupied by Castilla
y León, one of the biggest regions in the Spanish territory. The municipalities
considered on these experiments are those with 1,000 or more inhabitants within
the selected territory. The experimentation shows how the number of repeaters
needed varies depending on the distance as well as the minimums needed to585
cover the whole territory, interconnecting it entirely.
From this work there are several lines that can be continued in the future.
The most relevant are: extending the application territory, apply different algo-
rithms to design the network and new ones to connect existing ones. Another
interesting line, as we highlighted in Section 6, is to extend the algorithm to590
create secure networks. Finally, we will also study other physical features that
may affect the quality of the quantum key distribution network.
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